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Addressing Climate Change: Have the Political Winds
Shifted in Favor of a Carbon Tax?
Jesse Reiblich∗
Policymaking to combat climate change has been almost
nonexistent despite the scientific community’s consensus that the
time to act is now. Regardless, climate change remains a volatile
political issue that divides our nation and its legislators. Advocates
of reducing carbon emissions have traditionally endorsed several
tools available to policymakers and administrative agencies in order
to curb climate change: rulemaking under the Clean Air Act, capand-trade, and carbon taxes. Carbon tax legislation has gained
traction after endorsements from both sides of the political aisle, and
because it could be used to raise funds to reduce the United States’
deficit. Even policymakers that categorically refuse to raise taxes
may be willing to introduce a carbon tax if it is coupled with tax
reductions elsewhere. This Article considers these traditional
options for reducing carbon emissions and argues that recent
political rhetoric seems to set the stage for passing a carbon tax
where passage was once believed to be impossible.
INTRODUCTION
While experts debate both the existence and causes of climate
change, the growing consensus among scientists, and the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,1 is that climate change
is a real phenomenon that has been caused, at least in part, by
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions.2 Likewise, the consensus
is that this phenomenon is a problem that needs to be addressed as
soon as possible in order to avoid massive, irrevocable climate
Copyright 2013, by JESSE REIBLICH.
∗ Florida Climate Institute Fellow, 2012–2013. LL.M. 2013, J.D. 2011,
University of Florida Levin College of Law. B.A. 2006, University of Florida.
1. Organization, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is an intergovernmental, scientific
body comprised of 195 countries that was established by the United Nations
Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization
in order to “provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of
knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic
impacts.” Id.
2. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Susan Solomon et al.
eds., 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth
_assessment_report_wg1_report_the_physical_science_basis.htm.
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change.3 Most scientists agree that reducing the carbon dioxide
humans emit into the environment is a necessary step for slowing
down or stopping climate change.4 Logically, the next question is
one of prevention: what is the best way to effectively reduce carbon
dioxide emissions?
In the United States there are several possibilities on the table.
First, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency could reduce
carbon dioxide emissions through its “command and control”
powers under the various provisions of the Clean Air Act.5Second,
Congress could implement a cap-and-trade scheme like the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme implemented by the
European Union to comply with its member countries’ obligations
under the Kyoto Protocol.6 Third, Congress could also implement a
plan similar to the sulfur dioxide trading scheme the U.S. set up to
curb acid rain.7 Finally, Congress could levy a carbon tax on carbon
dioxide emissions like Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have done.8
This final option is attractive because it would simultaneously
reduce the deficit.
This Article first considers some of the most popular proposed
methods the United States could employ to reduce its carbon
emissions and attempts to determine which method, or methods, the
United States should implement. Part I will introduce and briefly
discuss the three methods of reducing carbon dioxide emissions that
are currently front-runners in the U.S. Parts II through IV will
consider the pros and cons of trying to reduce carbon emissions
under each of the methods introduced in Part I—the Clean Air Act,
a cap-and-trade emissions scheme, and a carbon tax, respectively.
Finally, Part V presents a tax “swap” as perhaps the best option.

3. Id. at 2. According to the IPCC, the world’s average temperature has risen
0.74 degrees in the past century. The IPCC estimates that the world’s average
temperature will rise an additional three degrees over the next century if CO2
levels continue to rise at their current rate. Id.
4. See id. at 5. The IPCC’s data suggests that “[m]ost of the observed
increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely
due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” Id.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See infra Part IV.
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I. OVERVIEW
The three methods of carbon emissions reductions compared in
this paper are regulatory controls under the Clean Air Act, cap-and
trade, and a tax on carbon.
In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA,9 the Environmental
Protection Agency could try to curb climate change by regulating
carbon dioxide emissions under several different titles of the Clean
Air Act. Under Title I, the EPA could identify carbon dioxide as a
criteria pollutant under the Act10 and set a National Ambient Air
Quality Standard (NAAQS) for carbon dioxide.11 Under Title II, the
EPA could further reduce motor vehicle carbon dioxide emissions.12
Finally, under Title V, the EPA could attempt to regulate and reduce
carbon dioxide emissions from major stationary sources of carbon
dioxide emissions through the development of state implementation
plans (SIPs) in conjunction with the states.13
Cap-and-trade schemes involve implementing an overall cap on
the amount of carbon dioxide emissions that the United States
allows carbon dioxide producers to emit.14 Companies would then
be given carbon credits that collectively equal the total cap amount
of carbon dioxide emissions.15 Alternatively, a system could be
devised which would allow producers to bid for and pay market
value for these credits. Under a free allocation of credits system,
producers that emit less than the amount allowed by their allotted
credits could sell their excess credits to companies that need them to
operate. Selling these excess credits to other companies provides an
economic incentive for companies to emit less carbon dioxide than
their carbon credits allow. Likewise, under this scheme the United
States would be able to lower the overall cap as it wished in order to
lower the total amount of carbon dioxide emissions of the country as
9. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (holding
that greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, fall “well within the Clean Air
Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant.’”).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2006) (establishing air quality criteria).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006) (defining National Ambient Air Quality
Standards).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (requiring the EPA to regulate “the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines, which in [the EPA Administrator’s] judgment cause,
or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare.”).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661–7661f (2006).
14. Cap and Trade, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov
/captrade/ (last updated May 10, 2012).
15. Allowance Trading Basics, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa
.gov/airmarkets/trading/basics.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2009).
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a whole.16 By lowering its carbon dioxide emissions, the U.S. would
combat further climate change.
Finally, Congress could tax carbon dioxide emissions or the
production of carbon-dioxide-emitting fossil fuels and electricity.17
This tax could be raised or lowered each year depending on whether
the U.S. met its annual goal of carbon dioxide emission reductions.18
The goal of a carbon tax is to internalize the external costs of using
fossil fuels, specifically the cost to society of releasing carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere.19 Currently, carbon dioxide emitters
pay nothing for the effects of their emissions on the environment.20
A carbon tax would also lower both industry-produced carbon
dioxide emissions and consumer use of carbon-dioxide-emitting
products.21 A carbon tax enjoys support on both sides of the political
aisle because of its potential to produce revenue to reduce the United
States’ deficit.22
16. Such a reduction could allow the United States to comply with
international attempts to deal with climate change, such as the Kyoto Protocol. See
Kyoto Protocol art. 3, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (under which the U.S. would
have been required to reduce its overall emissions by 5% from 1990 levels).
17. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming
Than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 31 (2009) (A tax on the production
of fuels is an “upstream” carbon tax. A “downstream” carbon tax on users of fuels
would be harder to implement and effectively enforce.).
18. Id. at 32–33.
19. Id. The cost to society of releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere in
this case would be climate change.
20. Instead, carbon emissions are a negative externality borne by the public as
a whole. Id. at 32 (explaining that the harmful effects of carbon dioxide emissions
are currently a negative externality).
21. Producers might pay less as the cost of emitting increases. Likewise,
consumers might consume less as the price of greenhouse gas intensive products
increases. See IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007
WORKING GROUP III: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, ch. 13, at 755 (B. Metz,
et al., eds., 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch13s132-1-2.html (“Each emitter weighs the cost of emissions control against the cost of
emitting and paying the tax; the end result is that polluters undertake to implement
those emission reductions that are cheaper than paying the tax, but they do not
implement those that are more expensive. Since every emitter faces a uniform tax
on emissions per tonne of GHG (if energy, equipment and product markets are
perfectly competitive), emitters will undertake the least expensive reductions
throughout the economy, thereby equalizing the marginal cost of abatement (a
condition for cost-effectiveness).”) (internal citation omitted) [hereinafter IPCC
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT].
22. Former Representative Bob Inglis (R-S.C.) supports a carbon tax as a way
to “account[] for the true cost of the fuels we use.” Brad Plumer, Could
Republicans Ever Support a Carbon Tax? Bob Inglis Thinks So., WASH. POST,
(Mar. 14, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog
/wp/2013/03/14/could-republicans-ever-support-a-carbon-tax-bob-inglis-thinks-so.
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II. REGULATIONS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The United States could also use its existing regulatory powers
under the Clean Air Act to curb climate change. The EPA can
regulate carbon dioxide emissions under Titles I, II, V, or a
combination of these Titles. In order for the EPA to regulate carbon
dioxide under Title I, the EPA must identify carbon dioxide as a
criteria pollutant and also set a National Ambient Air Quality
Standard (NAAQS) for carbon dioxide.23 Likewise, the EPA can
reduce carbon dioxide emissions from new motor vehicles under its
power in Title II to regulate moving sources of emissions.24 Finally,
the EPA can institute a permitting program for major stationary
sources of carbon dioxide emissions under Title V.25 This Article
considers these three Titles together because the strongest case for
the EPA’s ability to curb climate change can be made if the EPA
attempts to use all three of these regulatory devices together at once.
Regulating carbon dioxide emissions under Titles I, II, and V
has several advantages. First, the EPA can institute new regulations
without having to go through Congress. Instead, the EPA would
have to submit new rules in the Federal Register and follow the
proper rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure
Act.26 Rulemaking is typically a faster and more efficient method of
policymaking than trying to pass a law through Congress, but an
agency must only enact rules within the powers granted to it through
particular legislation.27 As such, it would be quicker to promulgate
new regulations under the Clean Air Act than it would be for
23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7409 (2006).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (requiring the EPA Administrator to,
“by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the
provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant
from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,
which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”). The EPA has recently
proposed a rule to do precisely this. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed.
Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600) [hereinafter
Light-Duty Vehicle Emission Standards].
25. See, e.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse
Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule].
26. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501–706 (2006).
27. Congress must provide, at a minimum, an intelligible principle with which
an agency must adhere. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
409 (1928) (“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle
to which the person or body authorized to [administer a statutory scheme] is
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.”).
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Congress to pass a cap-and-trade or carbon tax bill, but such
regulations would probably not be as powerful or as effective as
laws enacted by Congress.
Another advantage of regulating carbon dioxide under the Clean
Air Act is that much of the implementation and regulation would be
left to the states.28 Under the Clean Air Act, states are left to develop
State Implementation Plans that best adhere to the Act’s pollution
reduction goals, as long as such plans meet or exceed the minimum
levels required by statute.29 The EPA would most likely develop a
one-size-fits-all plan for all industries and regions of the United
States. Individual states, on the other hand, could set different goals
and timelines depending on their unique access to alternative energy
sources, respective industries, and so on. This approach seems more
efficient than a federal one-size-fits-all mandate on carbon emission
reductions, and it would be less stifling to industry.
However, there are several drawbacks to relying on the Clean
Air Act to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. First of all, though
rulemaking is usually more expedient than passing legislation
through Congress, rules can still be challenged and delayed. For
instance, Texas, along with several co-plaintiffs, challenged the
recently promulgated EPA rule limiting light-duty vehicle
greenhouse gas emissions.30 Likewise, the Sierra Club and six states
recently challenged the “tailoring rule”31 that the EPA promulgated
under Title V, which treats major stationary sources of carbon
dioxide differently than smaller sources.32
Second, even when the EPA enacts rules that survive such
challenges, these rules still require an extended period of time to
have their intended effects. For instance, the challenged EPA rule
for vehicle greenhouse gas emissions survived litigation and took
effect in January 2011, but its restrictions will not be fully instituted
until 2016.33 Even then, the rule will only apply to new vehicles, so
there will still be millions of cars on the roads that fall short of the
35.5 miles per gallon minimum imposed by the rule.

28. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
29. Id.
30. Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684 F.3d 102
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
31. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 26.
32. See Robin Bravender, Sierra Club, States File Challenges to EPA's
'Tailoring' Rule for Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. Times (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www
.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/03/03greenwire-sierra-club-states-file-challenges-toepas-tai-24900.html.
33. The rule covers vehicles produced between 2012 and 2016. See LightDuty Vehicle Emission Standards, supra note 25.
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Another drawback is the uncertainty about how much carbon
dioxide emission reduction these regulations can accomplish, even
collectively. For example, transportation emissions account for
about 28% of all carbon dioxide emissions in the United States.34 As
previously discussed, the EPA’s rule to raise the minimum fuel
efficiency standard to 35.5 miles per gallon does not apply
retroactively and will not take effect until 2016.35 Rules such as
these do not go far enough in a short enough timeframe to
effectively curb carbon dioxide emissions and slow down or stop
climate change.
Similarly, since the EPA can only enact rules within its specified
powers under the Clean Air Act, it probably cannot promulgate rules
stringent enough to reduce carbon dioxide emissions sufficiently to
curb climate change. The Clean Air Act’s purpose is to lower the
concentrations of pollutants in the air. Carbon dioxide is not
classified a pollutant in the same vein as lead or sulfur dioxide.36 As
such, enacting a NAAQS and then testing for carbon dioxide will do
no good because it is not the mere presence of carbon dioxide in the
air that is dangerous. Instead, it is the volume of carbon dioxide
emissions that cause icebergs to melt, sea levels to rise, and a variety
of similar effects that are dangerous to the public—not the presence
of carbon dioxide gas in the atmosphere itself.37
Finally, one of the supposed strengths of regulating under the
Clean Air Act—state implementation—might actually be a
weakness. Individual states do not have the funding or resources to
adequately address an international problem like climate change.
Regulations under the Clean Air Act would permit greater overall
carbon dioxide emission reductions than piecemeal reductions by
the few states currently concerned about reducing emissions.38
34. Transportation’s Role in Climate Change, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
http://climate.dot.gov/about/transportations-role/overview.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2013).
35. See Light-Duty Vehicle Emission Standards, supra note 25.
36. Carbon dioxide is not harmful in the same immediately perceivable way
that pollutants, which are harmful to human health, are. Instead, carbon dioxide’s
harm is indirect—greenhouse gases cause sea levels to rise, which threaten coastal
states, such as Massachusetts. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497,
499 (2007) (“According to petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea levels
rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of
global warming.”). Further, the U.S. Supreme Court found that carbon dioxide is a
pollutant under the meaning of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 500 (“[G]reenhouse gases
fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant.’”).
37. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 500.
38. As expected, coastal states such as Massachusetts, are the most worried
about reducing emissions because of their susceptibility to a rise in sea level
caused by climate change. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497.
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Furthermore, several states failed to meet the deadlines imposed by
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.39 States may be unlikely to
meet future deadlines to reduce carbon dioxide emissions under the
Clean Air Act.
Even if the EPA enacted rules to limit carbon dioxide emissions
through all of the methods discussed above, these rules would not
reduce carbon dioxide emissions enough to effectively curb climate
change. Instead, a cap-and-trade scheme or a carbon tax would more
effectively address climate change in both the short and long runs.
The EPA has moved forward with rules to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions under the Clean Air Act, but only time will tell how
effective these regulations will be.40 Nevertheless, the EPA’s ability
to promulgate regulations, and its past successes doing so, makes
regulatory controls under the Clean Air Act an option that deserves a
hard look.41
III. CAP-AND-TRADE
Cap-and-trade schemes for carbon emissions can take several
forms, but they all include capping the total amount of emissions
allowed and allotting carbon credits to polluting companies.42 Capand-trade schemes share several advantages. One such advantage is
the economic incentive to reduce carbon emissions, while another is
an overall cap on carbon dioxide emissions that a government can
39. John N. Cushman Jr., States and Government Lag in Meeting Clean Air
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/16/us/statesand-government-lag-in-meeting-clean-air-law.html (“Three years after Congress
rewrote the Clean Air Act, the Federal Government and the states are consistently
behind on many of the law's demanding timetables, including a deadline for filing
smog-reduction plans that was missed today by about half the states.”); see also
Evan Weinberger, EPA Missed Western Clean Air Act Deadlines: CBD, LAW360
(Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/165338/epa-missed-westernclean-air-act-deadlines-cbd (“The group said in its letter that it had uncovered the
EPA's alleged failures under the Clean Air Act after reviewing where the agency
had and had not complied with the statute since Congress made the amendments in
1990.”).
40. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684 F.3d
102, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (finding that the EPA’s actions to regulate greenhouse
gases were based on the clear intent of Congress under the Clean Air Act).
41. See Highlights from the Clean Air Act 40th Anniversary Celebration, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/40th_highlights.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2013) (highlighting of the successes of the Clean Air Act during its
first forty years).
42. Allowance Trading Basics, U.S ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www
.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/basics.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (“Cap and trade
programs use emission allowances as the currency to comply with emission
reduction requirements.”).
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lower based on how many reductions it wants to make.43 The
primary economic incentive under a cap-and-trade scheme is that
companies are able to sell leftover carbon credits.44 The “cap” in
cap-and-trade is a powerful regulatory tool because it allows a
government to be certain that it is reducing its carbon emissions by a
certain amount.45 A carbon tax, on the other hand, would not ensure
a reduction in carbon emissions by itself; as companies and
consumers could continue to produce and consume at pre-carbon tax
levels by paying more.46
Implementing a cap-and-trade system is arguably the most
popular of the available methods for reducing carbon dioxide
emissions. Cap-and-trade was originally a Republican-backed
answer to climate change and emissions reductions.47 Lately, it has
fallen out of favor with both the GOP and some Democrats.48
Regardless, one of the few issues that Senators McCain and Obama
agreed on during the 2008 election was the need for a cap-and-trade

43. In order to make any actual progress, the cap would need to be lowered
over time. CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, CAP AND TRADE 101, at 1 (Jan.
2008), http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2008/01/pdf
/capandtrade101.pdf (“To achieve this goal [of limiting the rise in global
temperature to approximately 2.0 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by
2050], the U.S. government should steadily tighten the cap until emissions are
reduced to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.”).
44. The economic incentive comes from being able to sell unused credits to
other polluters, environmentalists, non-profits, or other interested parties, who then
hold these credits so that they are not used and therefore less pollution occurs.
Buying Allowances, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets
/trading/buying.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (“Under both the Acid Rain
Program and the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), anyone can purchase
allowances, including both regulated companies and members of the general
public. Some individuals and groups purchase allowances as an environmental
statement, because withholding allowances from the market prevents those
allowances from being used by regulated sources to cover emissions.”).
45. See CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, supra note 44, at 1.
46. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 46–47 (explaining that this
uncertainty surrounding a reduction of carbon dioxide emissions as a result of a
carbon tax as the “benefit uncertainty” aspect of such a tax).
47. Daniel J. Weiss, The GOP Changes its Tune on Cap-and-Trade, GRIST
(Oct. 23, 2010, 3:12 AM) http://www.grist.org/article/2010-10-22-gop-changestune-on-cap-and-trade-reagan.
48. See id. (explaining that the Republican Party promised to oppose attempts
to impose a national cap-and-trade energy tax in its 2010 “Pledge to America”);
Alexander Mooney, Manchin Actually Puts a Bullet Through Cap and Trade Bill,
CNN (Oct. 11, 2010, 11:56 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/11
/manchin-actually-puts-a-bullet-through-cap-and-trade-bill/ (stating that Senatorelect Joe Manchin (D) of West Virginia “shot the cap-and-trade bill with a rifle” in
a 2010 campaign advertisement).
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emission-trading scheme to combat climate change.49 They
disagreed, however, on how the credits should be allotted to
polluters.50 McCain favored allotting credits to currently polluting
companies for free at the allocation date.51 Obama, on the other
hand, championed a cap-and-trade system that auctioned off carbon
credits to companies rather than giving them away for free.52
These types of cap-and-trade schemes share some of the same
general criticisms. For instance, critics point out that even if the U.S.
adopts a cap-and-trade scheme, the fact that China and India have
not may cause U.S. companies to move to those countries, which
would hurt the U.S. economy and cost the U.S. jobs.53 Also, the
U.S. would not net the intended benefit of instituting a cap-and-trade
program if the polluting companies move to another country and
continue to pollute at their current levels.54 Fears of this sort were
among the reasons the U.S. signed the Kyoto Protocol but did not
ratify it.55
Critics of cap-and-trade argue that the idea of a cap does not
conform to the tenets of capitalism.56 Specifically, critics argue that,
in a capitalist system, the market and overall production should be
49. See Dan Shapley, Green Election Issues 101: Global Warming, The Daily
Green (Aug. 26, 2008, 5:15 AM), http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmentalnews/latest/global-warming-47082511. But see John M. Broder, Both Romney and
Obama Avoid Talk of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2012, at A18
(pointing out that “neither [President Obama] nor Mr. Romney has laid out during
the campaign a legislative or regulatory program to address the fundamental
questions arising from one of the most vexing economic, environmental, political
and humanitarian issues to face the planet.”).
50. Shapley, supra note 50.
51. Id. (“[McCain] would allot credits to existing polluters, rather than
auctioning them off.”).
52. Id.
53. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to
Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 357 (2008) (arguing that
this problem could be overcome by requiring importers of highly carbon-intensive
goods from countries that have not taken climate policy actions comparable to the
United States to hold appropriate quantities of carbon credits); but see Idiots,
CLIMATE WONK (Oct. 20, 2010), http://thecarboneconomist.wordpress.com/2010
/10/20/idiots/ (explaining that a study found that China already has a substantial
implicit price on carbon without a formal carbon trading scheme or tax in place).
54. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 47 (discussing this as
another form of benefit uncertainty that is possible under a carbon tax scheme).
55. SUSAN R. FLETCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30692, GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 12 (2005) (discussing that the U.S.
signed the Kyoto Protocol on November 12, 1998, but President Clinton did not
submit the Protocol to Senate; in 2001, President Bush rejected the Protocol).
56. See generally William O’Keefe, A Bad Bill For Cap-And-Trade, FORBES
(June 8, 2009, 1:53 PM) http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/08/waxman-markey-billcarbon-emission-opinions-contributors-cap-and-trade.html.
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ever increasing, which means a cap, as a regulatory tool, is ill-suited
to allow production and gross domestic product values to increase.
Likewise, it could be argued that lowering the cap in order to reduce
overall carbon emissions also is anti-capitalistic.57 The obvious
response to this criticism is that the market could still grow while we
reduce carbon dioxide emissions as long as better, cleaner
technologies are developed.
The two primary types of cap-and-trade are different enough
from each other that they are worth discussing individually. In order
to keep these two cap-and-trade schemes distinct, the pros and cons
of each will be discussed in the following subsections.
A. Free Allocation of Carbon Credits
Cap-and-trade schemes that allocate carbon credits to
corporations for free generally benefit those corporations first and
foremost. For instance, corporations can continue to pollute at the
levels they had prior to the cap-and-trade but will benefit monetarily
if they reduce their emissions and sell their leftover credits.58 Of
course, in order to combat climate change, the cap must eventually
be lowered.59 However, companies would have time to adapt to this
lower cap and could buy leftover credits from other companies if
they failed to lower their emissions in time for the cap reduction.
These are the two primary benefits of this pollution allocation
scheme: first, companies have an economic incentive to pollute less,
and second, the government could reduce the cap, at will, to bring
about carbon emissions reductions at a swifter pace.
Another advantage this method of cap-and-trade has over other
methods of carbon emissions reductions is that it would not stifle
industry and production as much as the alternatives.60 Free
allocation schemes allow time for companies and industries that are
behind the curve to develop the technology to reduce their carbon
emissions instead of forcing them to start paying for emission
57. In a capitalist system, the goal is a growing economy, which is usually
accomplished via increased production and increased outputs. A “cap” necessarily
goes against these capitalist tenets.
58. For example, assume a company is allotted credits for 1,000 units of
carbon dioxide emissions. If the company keeps emitting at this level, it does not
gain (nor does it lose) anything. If it lowers its emissions to 900 units by installing
emissions reducing technology, it would then be able to sell its excess 100 credits
to another emitter, perhaps one just entering the marketplace.
59. In order to reduce the total emissions in order to slow climate change, the
cap on emissions must be lowered.
60. Whether technology-forcing regulations actually stifles industry, and to
what extent, is a contentious topic. See Jackson, infra note 63.
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credits or levying taxes against them under a carbon tax scheme.61
This is a very strong argument for this form of cap-and-trade, but the
argument could just as easily be made that companies are not
willing to innovate just to improve the environment, and therefore, it
is up to the government to push them along.62
Despite its benefits, there are several drawbacks to a cap-andtrade scheme that allocates credits at no cost to polluting companies.
Giving away pollution credits punishes those companies that reduce
their emissions prior to the allocation of these credits because these
companies are allotted fewer credits than if they had not reduced
their emissions.63 Likewise, the mere possibility that this form of
cap-and-trade could be implemented may be currently deterring
emission reductions because it benefits companies to adopt a “waitand-see” approach to lowering emissions. While this sort of capand-trade scheme is still on the table, companies might find it
beneficial to continue their current levels of emissions.
Another criticism of the free allocation of carbon credits is that
allocating credits is an inexact science.64 Previous credit trading
markets have over-allocated credits, which led to market crashes.

61. Cap-and-trade would be less stifling because it would allow for a settling
in period and predictability, and current polluters could be allowed to pollute at
their current levels before the cap is eventually lowered. CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS, supra note 44, at 1 (“The federal government can also choose to
‘grandfather’ allowances to the polluting firms by handing them out free based on
historic or projected emissions. This would give the most benefits to those
companies with higher baseline emissions that have historically done the least to
reduce their pollution.”).
62. E.g., Lisa P. Jackson, The Clean Air Act by the Numbers, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/lisa-p-jackson/the-clean-air-act-by-the-_b_731564.html (noting that when
the Clean Air Act was first enacted, lobbyists claimed that “entire industries
[would] collapse” if catalytic converters were required for new cars and trucks, but
instead, the Act essentially “gave birth to a global market for catalytic converters
and enthroned American manufacturers at the pinnacle of that market.”).
63. Giving away pollution credits might even incentivize emitting more
carbon dioxide during the year that establishes the benchmark for allocating
credits to polluters. This problem seems like it could be mitigated to some extent
by taking an average of the past several years rather than basing the benchmark on
any one year.
64. For example, the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme initially
failed because it over-allocated credits. OPEN EUROPE, EUROPE’S DIRTY SECRET:
WHY THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME ISN’T WORKING 5 (Aug. 2007),
http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/etsp2.pdf (“Huge overallocation of permits to pollute led to a collapse in the price of carbon from €33 to
just €0.20 per tonne, meaning that the system did not reduce emissions at all.”).
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The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS)65 is an
example of a scheme in which over-allocation of carbon credits had
a disastrous effect on the market. The EU-ETS is the largest carbon
emissions trading market in the world and one of the first of its
kind.66 When the EU-ETS market first allocated credits in 2005,
European governments overestimated the amount of permits that
should be issued.67 The result of this over-allocation was a collapse
of the market, with carbon credits plummeting from €33 per unit to
€0.20 within the year.68 The possibility of similar market crashes
makes other cap-and-trade scheme types or a carbon tax that much
more attractive.
In the United States, a recent over-allocation of credits in the
Acid-Rain Program69 has yielded similar results to those
experienced by the European Union. The Acid-Rain Program is a
sulfur dioxide trading program that the EPA instituted as part of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.70 Despite reducing sulfur
dioxide emissions by half since 1995, the acid-rain trading market
eventually collapsed.71 This collapse highlighted why using marketbased tools to address environmental protection concerns can have
unintended consequences.72 Because of the collapse, companies now
have a financial incentive to emit more sulfur dioxide into the air in

65. See generally The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last updated
July 1, 2013).
66. Id.
67. OPEN EUROPE, supra note 66, at 5.
68. Id.
69. See Acid Rain Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov
/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/index.html (last updated July 25, 2012).
70. See DAVID M. BEARDEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30798,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS: SUMMARIES OF MAJOR STATUTES ADMINISTERED BY THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 3 (2010) (“Changes to the [Clean Air
Act] in 1990 included provisions to…establish an acid rain control program, with
a marketable allowance scheme to provide flexibility in implementation . . .”).
71. Mark Peters, Changes Choke Cap-and-Trade Market, WALL ST. J. (July
12, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870425860457536082
1005676554.html.
72. The crash resulted after a federal appeals court tossed out the EPA’s
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) in 2008, and the resulting unintended
consequences stemmed from polluters polluting as much as they can before the
EPA introduced a replacement Rule. Gabriel Nelson, Uneasy Emission Traders
Seek Help From Congress on CAIR Replacement, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/07/12/12greenwire-uneasy-emission-tradersseek-help-from-congres-53513.html?pagewanted=all (explaining that “pollution is
likely to spike in the short run as utilities prepare for the final version of the
proposed rule [designed to replace CAIR] to take effect.”).
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order to drive the value of their sulfur credits back up again.73
Companies now have no incentive to avoid emissions or to hold
credits for the future, because the credits are almost worthless.74
Over-allocation of credits has, to a large extent, been the result
of companies lobbying for credits they do not need. For example, in
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, companies
projected inflated carbon emissions in order to acquire more
credits.75 These inflated projections result in the companies with the
best lobbyists “winning” the most carbon credits.76 This system also
paid polluters to not pollute despite the fact that they were already
limiting their pollution because of other environmental laws and not
because of the cap-and-trade system.77 This unintended and
unattractive result highlights this particular cap-and-trade scheme’s
primary weakness compared to the scheme that auctions off credits.
Under a cap-and-trade system that gives away credits, companies do
not have an explicit monetary incentive for which to aim to reduce
their emissions outlook. Lowering their emission outlook would
reduce the number of credits these companies are given in this
scheme.
Another criticism of this form of cap-and-trade is that it is
susceptible to fraud, corruption, and scams.78 One type of scam
involves the clean-up of “exotic” greenhouse gases under the Kyoto
Protocol.79 One such greenhouse gas is HFC-23.80 This gas is
extremely potent, with one ton of HFC-23 being as potent as 11,700
tons of carbon dioxide.81 Companies that reduce the emission of this
gas receive tens of thousands of carbon credits for doing so, but
simply installing a scrubber for a few million dollars can reduce
these emissions.82 The result is another financial windfall, with
73. Id. (“Existing allowances of SO2 traded at about $5 per ton last week,
down from about $15 per ton before the release of the transport rule. They had
hovered around $300 per ton before CAIR's rejection in 2008.”).
74. Id.
75. Kevin Smith, Stern Words While in the EU They’re Trading Hot Air,
PARLIMENTARY BRIEFING 25–26 (Dec. 2006), http://www.carbontradewatch.org
/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=36.
76. Id.
77. Id. (noting that “[t]he fact that their emissions were already controlled
under other environmental regulations led Edward Leigh, the Conservative chair
of the Public Accounts Committee, to observe that the scheme ‘seems to be paying
[the four companies] £11 million for keeping emissions down to levels they had
already achieved before they joined.’”).
78. See generally OPEN EUROPE, supra note 66.
79. OPEN EUROPE, supra note 66, at 7.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.

2013]

CLIMATE CHANGE: CARBON TAX?

63

participants in the clean-up of this exotic gas getting the benefit of
some €4.6 billion for processes that cost only about €100 million to
carry out.83 If the U.S. institutes a cap-and-trade scheme like the
EU-ETS, it should minimize loopholes such as this one.
The likelihood of passing this kind of cap-and-trade bill through
Congress seems to be fading with every passing election. Even
Senator John McCain, who ran for President in 2008 on a platform
calling for cap-and-trade and who co-sponsored a cap-and-trade bill
back in 2003, called cap-and-trade legislation “cap-and-tax” and
eventually argued against its implementation.84 Likewise, despite
being an early champion of cap-and-trade, the GOP has essentially
abandoned the concept.85 The reasons for this change are subject to
debate, but it is worth pointing out that former President George
H.W. Bush, a Republican, signed the first successful cap-and-trade
legislation in the U.S. and that, until recently, Republicans Sarah
Palin and Newt Gingrich supported cap-and-trade.86 Likewise,
several Republicans who now staunchly oppose cap-and-trade in
any form voted for the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which
included the acid-rain trading cap-and-trade program.87 This change
of heart seems to be the result of heavy lobbying by the oil and gas
industries88 and the emergence of Tea Party Republicans.89 Tea
83. Id. at 8.
84. Andrew Schenkel, Cap-and-Trade is the Latest Twist in John McCain's
Quest for Re-Election, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Aug. 24, 2010, 12:24 PM),
http://www.mnn.com/earth-matters/politics/stories/cap-and-trade-is-the-latesttwist-in-john-mccains-quest-for-re-electi.
85. Daniel J. Weiss, The GOP Changes its Tune on Cap and Trade, CENTER
FOR AMERICAN PRESS (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues
/green/news/2010/10/22/8499/the-gop-changes-its-tune-on-cap-and-trade/.
86. Id.
87. Id. (counting among the staunch conservatives that voted for the Clear Air
Act the following Senators: Kit Bond (R-Mo.), Trent Lott (R-Miss.), Mitch
McConnell (R-Ky.), and Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.). Conservative House
supporters included Reps. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), Joe Barton (R-Tex.), Dennis
Hastert (R-Ill.), Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), and Fred Upton (R-Mich.)).
88. Matt Gertz, FoxPAC: Gingrich Attacks Cap and Trade on Fox While His
Political Committee Takes Fossil Fuel Money, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA
(Apr. 19, 2010, 11:21 AM), http://mediamatters.org/research/201004190019
(noting that Newt Gingrich’s political action committee received $350,000 from a
major coal-producing company in the first quarter of 2010 alone).
89. Brad Plumer, How the Tea Party Changed the Climate Debate, WASH.
POST (Sept. 7, 2011, 1:12 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog
/post/how-the-tea-party-changed-the-climate-debate/2011/09/07/gIQAVMMh9J
_blog.html (“Self-identified Tea Party types make up just 12 percent of the
country, but they tend to be the fiercest global-warming deniers: ‘Majorities of
Democrats (78%), Independents (71%) and Republicans (53%) believe that global
warming is happening. By contrast, only 34 percent of Tea Party members believe
global warming is happening, while 53 percent say it is not happening.’”).
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Party candidates, who seem to be setting the GOP’s agenda after the
party’s major losses in 2006 and 2008, have repeatedly denied the
existence of climate change.90 One New York Times columnist
argues that the Tea Party mindset “aligns with [that] of the fossil
fuel industries, which have for decades waged a concerted campaign
to raise doubts about the science of global warming and to
undermine policies devised to address it.”91 As such, this form of
cap-and-trade may be the least likely of the possible methods of
emission reductions to be implemented.92
B. Auctioning Carbon Credits
The other popular option for cap-and-trade involves auctioning
carbon credits rather than simply allocating credits to carbonemitting businesses for free.93 By auctioning off credits, companies
would hopefully pay the government larger amounts for the ability
to continue emitting harmful greenhouse gases.94 There are several
advantages to such a scheme. On its face, this scheme seems to be a
fairer way to apportion harmful carbon dioxide emissions between
competing companies because a company must pay in proportion to
how much they pollute.95
A major advantage to this scheme is that it generates revenue
that the government can use to both fund research and subsidize
90. See John M. Broder, Climate Change Doubt is Tea Party Article of Faith,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at A1.
91. Id.
92. However, tea party support is beginning to wane. Lydia Saad, Tea Party
Support Dwindles to Near-Record Low, GALLUP (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www
.gallup.com/poll/164648/tea-party-support-dwindles-near-record-low.aspx
(“Fewer Americans now describe themselves as supporters of the Tea Party
movement than did at the height of the movement in 2010, or even at the start of
2012. Today's 22% support nearly matches the record low found two years ago.”).
93. FAQs Cap and Trade, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa
.gov/captrade/faqs.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2013) (explaining the difference
between an auction-based cap system and an allocation-based system: “In an
auction system, the government must design an auction and allocate the proceeds.
In an allocation system the government must decide who receives allowances and
how many they receive. The process of determining which cap and trade system to
use is not a substantial factor in a program’s success. It is an important step, but
one that does not affect the ability of a program to promote human health and
environmental benefits. It is the emission cap and banking that determine the
amount of reductions a program can achieve.”).
94. This scheme is essentially a type of “polluter pays” system. See, e.g.,
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, at
Principle 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992)
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.
95. Id.
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alternative energy sources.96 Auctioning carbon credits at the outset
has some of the same benefits as a carbon tax. For instance,
auctioning credits raises government revenue and directly impacts
the largest polluters because they end up paying the most to pollute.
Auctioning credits also provides an economic incentive to limit
carbon-dioxide emissions.97 Auctioning credits avoids the main
pitfall of allotting free carbon credits by ensuring that the number of
credits auctioned off matches the needs of the bidding companies.98
A well-planned carbon auction should result in market equilibrium
that would reduce the risk of market crashes compared to the other
type of cap-and-trade.99
Auctioning credits also would not penalize corporations that
may have already attempted to reduce emissions before the
allocation of credits Instead, these environmentally responsible
corporations would pay less for carbon credits, because they would
need to buy fewer of them, than competitor corporations that have
not yet reduced emissions.
In the United States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI),100 which began operating in 2009,101 is an example of this
kind of cap-and-trade scheme.102 Early indications seem to suggest
that the program is working as planned.103 Likewise, the European
96. For example, President Obama’s 2010 Budget proposed using monies
collected from payments for greenhouse gas emissions to fund clean technologies.
Kevin Eber, President’s Budget Draws Clean Energy Funds from Climate
Measure, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.renewable
energyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/03/presidents-budget-draws-clean-energyfunds-from-climate-measure?cmpid=WNL-Friday-March6-2009 (“The president's
proposed budget directs $15 billion per year of those funds toward clean energy
technologies, while directing the remaining funds toward a tax cut.”).
97. If a polluter reduces its emissions, it reduces the number of credits it needs
to operate. A carbon tax also features this incentive for companies that reduce their
emissions. FAQs Cap and Trade, supra note 95 (“Cap and trade programs and
tax-based programs are similar in that they are market-based and create a price for
emissions. It is this price that creates a financial incentive to reduce emissions.”).
98. A company is not going to pay for credits it does not need, but a company
would accept extra free credits, especially if it could then sell those credits.
99. For instance, a free market emissions trading scheme could avoid a
collapse like the one suffered by the acid rain program. See Peters, supra note 73.
100. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/home (last
visited Oct. 9, 2013).
101. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, OVERVIEW OF RGGI CO2
BUDGET TRADING PROGRAM (Oct. 2007) available at http://www.rggi.org/docs
/program_summary_10_07.pdf.
102. Id. at 4 (“Under RGGI, instead of giving allowances directly to electric
generators for free, states would sell a significant portion or all allowances through
a regional auction or otherwise.”).
103. John Dillon, Regional Greenhouse Gas Effort Eyed As National Model,
VERMONT PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 25, 2013), http://digital.vpr.net/post/regional-
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Union Emissions Trading Scheme moved from free allocation of
credits to an auction model in 2013.104
Auctioning credits also avoids many of the possible scams and
lobbying problems of a system that gives away credits. The reason is
simple—if a company has to pay for its carbon credits at an auction,
that company does not have a motive to obtain more credits than it
needs.
An auction scheme also avoids the possible takings inherent in
giving corporations quantifiable rights to freely pollute and then
reducing the limit on those pollution rights in the future. Instead,
these companies would have to buy carbon credits each year. This
scheme would allow the government the ability to reduce the overall
number of credits issued but still allow companies to buy the same
number of credits each year. Companies may have to pay more for
credits if they do not reduce their emissions in line with the lowered
overall cap. This system incentivizes carbon emission reductions but
allows companies behind the curve time to catch up or else pay
more to remain large polluters.
A popular criticism of an auction system is that such a system is
really just a carbon tax in disguise.105 Even President Obama has
admitted that this kind of carbon auctioning cap-and-trade scheme
works like a carbon tax.106 The obvious counterargument to such a
criticism is that auctioning credits is not a tax, but instead a device
that seeks to account for the externalities associated with carbon
emissions and then lower those externalities over time.107 Likewise,
a credit auction is not a tax because it is a market-based approach to
lowering carbon emissions. If a company reduces its emissions, it
will pay less as a result. The higher-polluting companies will need to

greenhouse-gas-effort-eyed-national-model (explaining that the RGGI has
exceeded expectations and is being hailed as a possible model for a nationwide
cap-and-trade scheme). However, the RGGI has made several amendments to its
initial agreement. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE , SUMMARY OF
RGGI MODEL RULE CHANGES (Feb. 2013) available at http://www.rggi.org/docs
/ProgramReview/_FinalProgramReviewMaterials/Model_Rule_Summary.pdf.
104. The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2013)
(“Auctioning, not free allocation, is now the default method for allocating
allowances. In 2013 more than 40% of allowances will be auctioned, and this
share will rise progressively each year”).
105. See, e.g., Sarah Palin, Op-Ed., The ‘Cap and Tax’ Dead End, WASH. POST
(July 14, 2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-07-14/opinions/36927
469_1_energy-sector-energy-policy-economic-growth-and-energy.
106. N. Gregory Mankiw, Op-Ed, A Missed Opportunity on Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at BU4.
107. See infra note 126 for a more in-depth discussion of externalities.
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spend more to make sure they secure carbon credits to meet their
production needs. By reducing their emissions, companies can wait
and bid less. Also, if all companies reduce their emissions more
quickly than the government lowers the cap, all bidding companies
win because they all end up paying less per credit. Under a carbon
tax scheme, companies would still pay the same per ton of carbon
emissions whether or not all the other companies were emitting less.
This sort of cap-and-trade scheme has lost a lot of steam since
President Obama first declared it a priority during his 2008
campaign.108 Instead of focusing on carbon emissions, Obama spent
the first year of his term, and most of his political capital, passing an
intensely controversial health care bill.109 Consequently, it now
seems like this form of cap-and-trade is obsolete.110 Further,
President Obama is not likely to risk his remaining political capital
supporting a cap-and-trade scheme in the near future due to its
waning popularity.
IV. CARBON TAX
A third method of reducing carbon dioxide emissions is to tax
the amount of carbon dioxide that companies emit into the
atmosphere. Like a cap-and-trade scheme, this tax could be applied
either upstream or downstream.111 An upstream tax would be
applied to fossil fuel production whereas a downstream tax would be
applied to emitters of greenhouse gases.112 Former Secretary of
Labor Robert Reich described a carbon tax as “a tax on all fossilbased fuels that reflects their true social, political, and
environmental costs.”113 This “true cost” of fossil fuels has
alternately been called the “social cost of carbon.”114 A carbon tax is
not a new idea. It is currently implemented in British Columbia
108. Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, at 70, 72
(“‘Energy we have to deal with today,’ Obama said in a debate with McCain
[during his Presidential campaign]. ‘Health care is priority No. 2.’”).
109. Id. at 83.
110. See id. (arguing that even Obama is no longer willing to fight for climate
change regulation and has moved from healthcare reform to the relatively safe
topic of securities regulation reform).
111. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 31. This Article assumes
for simplicity’s sake that a carbon tax instituted in the U.S. would be “upstream”
because the leading carbon tax proposals have been “upstream” taxes.
112. Id.
113. Robert B. Reich, Inherit the Windfall, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 7, 2007),
http://prospect.org/article/inherit-windfall.
114. See generally David Pearce, The Social Cost of Carbon and its Policy
Implications, 19 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 362 (2003), http://www
.climateactionproject.com/docs/SOCIAL_COST_OF_CARBON.pdf.
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Canada,115 as well as in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.116
A carbon tax is an attempt to account for the harmful effects of
carbon dioxide emissions.117 In a perfect market, the amount taxed
would equal the social cost of carbon.118
Perhaps the biggest benefit of a carbon tax is its simplicity. A
carbon tax can be applied to producers of fossil fuels and electricity
at a standard rate based on the tons of carbon they emit each year. At
the end of the year, the tax rate could be raised or lowered
depending on whether the carbon tax achieved the desired decrease
in carbon emissions. It is easier for a company to plan for a carbon
tax in its yearly operating budget than it would be for a company to
plan for the market price of a ton of carbon dioxide under the credit
auction form of cap-and-trade.119
Another advantage of a carbon tax is that it would produce
revenue for the federal government, which could then be used to
subsidize renewable energy projects. Alternatively, the government
could return these funds to the companies that had the lowest carbon
emission reductions for that year, thus providing another incentive
to produce fewer emissions.
Likewise, a carbon tax would provide the clearest incentive to
companies to reduce emissions. Board members could tell
shareholders that every ton of carbon emissions that they reduce
would save the company a defined amount of money. In contrast,

115. See Stewart Elgie, et al., Op-Ed., B.C.’s Carbon Tax is Looking like a
Winner, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 27, 2010, at A11, available at http://www2
.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/archives/story.html?id=ed4d2b45-480b-4fc2-8c1352dd1ab5a15a&p=2.
116. Monica Prasad, Op-Ed., On Carbon, Tax and Don’t Spend, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2008, at A27.
117. A harm, which the market does not account for, is known as an
“externality.” Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 30 (explaining that
“[f]rom an economic standpoint, however, carbon dioxide emissions are the
classic externality: emissions occur at no cost to the emitting facility, but at an
enormous cost to society as a whole.”). See generally Dieter Helm, Economic
Instruments and Environmental Policy, 36 ECON. & SOC. REV. 205 (2005)
(explaining that the classic solution to environmental externalities is imposing a
tax equal to the marginal social cost of the externality).
118. G.W. YOHE, ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY, ch. 20, at 823 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007) (“According to
economic theory, if the social cost calculations were complete and markets were
perfect, then efforts to cut back the emissions of greenhouse gases would continue
as long as the marginal cost of the cutbacks were lower than the social cost of the
impacts they cause. If taxes were used, then they should be set equal to the [social
cost of carbon].”).
119. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 42 (discussing this
advantage of carbon taxes as “cost certainty”).
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cap-and-trade schemes cause companies to spend fluctuating sums
of money on carbon credits, and companies can game the system.120
A carbon tax scheme is also less prone to lobbying, fraud, and
corruption than a cap-and-trade scheme would be.121 Under a carbon
tax scheme, all carbon-emitting companies must pay taxes based on
a set, yearly, carbon tax rate. There is no incentive to pollute more
initially, as there would be under the Free Allocation form of capand-trade discussed. Instead, companies would have an incentive to
emit less, so they pay less in taxes.
Current carbon tax schemes in other countries reveal possible
pros and cons of imposing a carbon tax here in the United States.
For example, a Norwegian carbon tax has not led to a reduction in
carbon emissions.122 Instead, emissions have increased by 43% per
capita in Norway.123 This phenomenon is a possibility in the U.S. as
well. It is possible that if the U.S. implements a carbon tax,
companies could keep producing emissions at previous levels, and
consumers could keep consuming at the same rate, in effect just
absorbing the added cost.
In Denmark, on the other hand, a carbon tax has led to emissions
decreases of 15% from 1990 emissions levels.124 Denmark has made
these reductions by returning much of the carbon tax revenue to the
companies in the form of subsidies for research and investment in
alternative energy technologies.125 This is a strategy policymakers
could use in the United States as well. The United States could
further incentivize emissions reductions by exempting companies
that reduce their emissions from a certain amount of the tax each
year. These reductions can be industry specific to make it fairer for
industries that have difficulty reducing emissions.
The contrast between the successful reductions in Denmark and
the failure to reduce emissions in Norway highlights another
criticized aspect of carbon taxes: the tax does not guarantee a

120. See OPEN EUROPE, supra note 66, at 33–40 (explaining the pitfalls of a
cap-and-trade system based on allocating credits). See, e.g., id. at 36 (“Because
companies in different member states are subject to different levels of stringency
in their overall emissions caps and their entitlement to use (cheaper) Kyoto credits,
there will be differentiated levels of ‘effort’ they need to make in order to comply
with the ETS.”).
121. The reason this scheme would be less prone to lobbying, fraud, and
corruption is because it is not susceptible to the same weaknesses as a cap-andtrade scheme. See supra Part III.
122. See, e.g., Prasad, supra note 125.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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reduction.126 Unlike a cap, which imposes an overall limit on
emissions, companies subject to a tax can continue to pollute and
just opt to pay the increasing carbon taxes if the conditions of the
market warrant doing so. However, as previously discussed, the
hope is that, by offering incentives to reduce carbon emissions and
to invest in cleaner energy sources, overall carbon emissions would
decrease. Also, if the desired decrease is not achieved, the carbon
tax rate could be raised in response.127
Detractors of a Denmark-style carbon tax point to the high cost
of energy in that country as the reason for its emission reductions.128
Indeed, in Denmark, energy prices are much higher than energy
prices in the U.S., and this very well might be the cause of the
reductions of carbon dioxide emissions in Denmark.129 Further, the
high cost of energy in Denmark might provide another argument
against implementing a carbon tax in the U.S.
Another popular criticism of carbon taxes is that taxes of this
sort are regressive, meaning that they disproportionately affect
poorer consumers.130 Specifically, fossil fuel producers will pass the
extra cost of these taxes on to the consumer, which hurts less
wealthy consumers who cannot reduce their gasoline or electricity
use as much as wealthy consumers who can afford to buy new more
fuel-efficient cars or afford more energy-efficient appliances in their
homes.131 One way to remedy this inequity would be to offer carbon
126. A tax would need to be high enough to change consumers’ behavior. See
Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 46 (“The main substantive disadvantage
of a carbon tax compared to cap and trade is Benefit Uncertainty. There can be no
assurance that any given tax level will result in the desired reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions. If the desired benefit is not achieved, the tax may have to be raised,
resulting in renewed political opposition, which could defeat the tax increase and
thereby limit the environmental benefits of the tax.”).
127. Id.
128. Jeff Rubin, Commentary, High Energy Prices Make Copenhagen Green,
GLOBE AND MAIL (Sept. 1, 2010, 6:17 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com
/report-on-business/commentary/jeff-rubins-smaller-world/high-energy-pricesmake-copenhagen-green/article1691382.
129. Id. (noting that electricity in Denmark costs anywhere from three to five
times what the average North American would pay at 30 cents per kilowatt-hour).
130. See IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 22 (“Furthermore,
emissions or energy taxes often fall disproportionately on lower income classes,
thereby creating negative distributional consequences.”).
131. A similar tax proposed by President Clinton in 1993 was defeated at least in
part because of claims that it would be regressive. Chris Casteel, Boren Targets
Clinton Btu Tax with Own Plan, NEWSOK (May 21, 1993), http://newsok.com
/boren-targets-clinton-btu-tax-with-own-plan/article/2431196 (“‘[Clinton’s proposed
Btu tax] is terribly regressive. It affects the lower and middle-income people and,
above all, it raises the cost of all our products in the world marketplace at a time
when we're trying to regain our competitive positions,’ Boren said.”).
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tax rebates to those individuals below a certain tax bracket.
However, this once-a-year “fix” might not be sufficient to help those
people living paycheck-to-paycheck.
The main disadvantage of the carbon tax perhaps is its name:
“tax.” The current political climate demonizes everything labeled a
tax.132 Former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin and other conservative
pundits have repeatedly referred to cap-and-trade as “cap-andtax.”133 Likewise, many members of the current Republicancontrolled House of Representatives were elected on campaign
platforms based on lowering taxes or at least keeping taxes at their
current rates. Calling a new carbon tax a “carbon fee” instead can
remedy this stigma to some extent. Instituting a Denmark-style
carbon tax could potentially fix the problem by returning most of the
tax proceeds to the emitting industries so long as they invest in
renewable energy sources.134 Additionally, a Denmark-style carbon
tax would be less stifling to the industry and face the least amount of
opposition from conservatives in Congress of all the forms of carbon
taxes, but projected increases in energy costs should be closely
scrutinized when considering this kind of tax.
Regardless of these disadvantages, carbon taxes have received at
least passing approval from even the staunchest of anti-tax lobbyists,
Grover Norquist.135 This approval was based on instituting carbon
taxes as a “carbon tax swap.”136 The attractiveness of a “swap” is
that it could allow for a new tax on carbon emissions, as long as that
new tax is accompanied by a tax reduction elsewhere.137 Therefore,

132. See Stavins, supra note 54, at 357 (claiming that the main disadvantage of
a carbon tax is the overriding resistance to new taxes in the current political
climate).
133. See Palin, supra note 111.
134. See Prasad, supra note 125 (characterizing Denmark’s successful carbon
tax as one that “you want to impose but never collect”).
135. Coral Davenport, Norquist: Carbon-Tax Swap for Income-Tax Cut
Wouldn't Violate No-Tax-Hike Pledge, NAT’L J. (Nov. 12, 2012, 5:09 PM),
http://www.nationaljournal.com//energy/norquist-carbon-tax-swap-for-incometax-cut-wouldn-t-violate-no-tax-hike-pledge-20121112 (“In a step that may help
crack open the partisan impasse on climate change, Grover Norquist, the
influential lobbyist who has bound hundreds of Republicans to a pledge never to
raise taxes, told National Journal that a proposed ‘carbon tax swap’— taxing
carbon pollution in exchange for cutting the income tax—would not violate his
pledge.”). But see Chris Prandoni, Americans for Tax Reform Opposes a Carbon
Tax, AMERICANS FOR TAX REFORM (Nov. 13, 2012, 9:27 AM), http://www.atr
.org/americans-tax-reform-opposes-carbon-a7346 (Grover Norquist reversing
course on his support for a carbon tax).
136. Davenport, supra note 145.
137. Id.
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a “swap” could allow Congress to pass a carbon tax despite the
current anti-tax climate in Washington.138
CONCLUSION
The two best options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in
the United States are a cap-and-trade system that auctions off carbon
credits or a carbon tax. Denmark provides an example of a country
that successfully cut national carbon dioxide emissions by instituting
a carbon tax. On the other hand, cap-and-trade has not worked as
designed in the past, and it is still largely untested in the United
States. However, the Northeast’s RGGI offers a possible model for
instituting an auction cap-and-trade system across the United States.
The choice between the two schemes will be based on the specific
terms of each. A carbon tax can work in the United States if the
government offers the right incentives to participating companies
and if the tax is not too high, but a carbon tax might not reduce
carbon dioxide emissions at all. A cap-and-trade system could work
in the United States if it were set up to avoid the problems
associated with such systems in the past. A cap-and-trade system
that gives away carbon credits is the least desirable method of
reducing carbon emissions. Free Allocation schemes are prone to
fraud and lobbying. Past examples have shown that they are
probably the least efficient of the proposed methods. Regulating
carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act does not seem to be the best
option available because that Act is a poor fit for the goals of carbon
dioxide emission reductions.
The EPA has enacted regulatory measures under the Clean Air
Act to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, but these will not be fast or
far-reaching enough to be preferable to a carbon tax or a cap-andtrade scheme. Between President Obama spending what political
capital he has on other more popular issues and a Republican House
of Representatives that seems opposed to all methods of carbon
emission reduction, Congress seems unlikely to pass any
environmental protection legislation to combat climate change in the
near future. However, a carbon tax would incentivize reductions of
emissions and would encourage technological innovations to reduce
emissions. Additionally, a carbon tax might be able to pass in
conjunction with a tax decrease elsewhere—in other words, even
policymakers that categorically refuse to raise taxes may be willing
to introduce a carbon tax if it is coupled with tax reductions
elsewhere. (The flexibility of this sort of “swap” would make
instituting a carbon tax a good option for combating climate
138. Id.
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change.) After considering traditional options for reducing carbon
emissions, recent trends in policy seem to suggest that the passage
of a carbon tax would be a logical, and perhaps politically agreeable,
step toward solving the climate crisis.

